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The present paper shows the macroeconomic and welfare implications of an aging
population in the United States, using an overlapping-generations model with hetero-
geneous households. The model uses three population projections in Social Security
Administration (2003), and generates economies as equilibrium transition paths from
1961 to 2200. The paper demonstrates how several different population projections and
government ﬁnancing assumptions—to make the Social Security system sustainable—
affect households’ decisions and welfare. The paper also shows that an immediate in-
crease in the payroll tax might not improve the welfare of future generations.
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11 Introduction
Many proposals for reforming the Social Security system in the United States have been
advanced in recent years. For example, Representatives Kolbe and Stenholm proposed the
2 1 s tC e n t u r yR e t i r e m e n tS e c u r i t yA c ti n1 9 9 8a n dr e v i s e di ti n1 9 9 9a n d2 0 0 1 ; and the
President’s Commission (2001) proposed three possible reform plans of U.S. Social Security.
Although many have already analyzed how much those proposals would improve the
actuarial balance, the macroeconomic and welfare implications of those reform plans are
still uncertain. However, to evaluate those effects of Social Security reform, a reasonable
baseline economy under the current law is also required.
The present paper constructs possible baseline economies with an aging population to
analyze Social Security reform plans, using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with
heterogeneous households. In this model, households receive idiosyncratic working ability
shocks and mortality shocks. Then, the paper shows the effects of simple reform plans as
policy experiments.
In this process, the following two aspects are stressed in the present paper:
First, like most other developed countries, the population distribution of the United Sates
is aging and, accordingly, the economy cannot be described as a stationary equilibrium. The
present paper constructs economies as equilibrium transition paths, solving the model from
1961 through 2200.1
Second, under a realistic population projection, the current-law Social Security system
is not sustainable. To solve the model for an equilibrium transition path, the model needs to
have an additional ﬁnancing assumption to close the intertemporal budget constraint for the
Social Security system.2
In Social Security Administration (2003), Trustees of Social Security have used three
possible population projections—alternative II (intermediate), alternative I (low cost), and
alternative III (high cost)—to evaluate the sustainability of the current Social Security sys-
1At the beginning of 1961, households in the model realize an aging population and choose their optimal
consumption, labor supply, and savings based on the correct population projection. The model assumes that this
adjustment process to an aging population from the initial steady state in 1961 is completed by 2003.
2Some examples of government ﬁnancing assumptions for the Social Security system are whether the payroll
tax is increased or beneﬁts are reduced, or both, and when the government changes the payroll tax rate or beneﬁt
replacement rates.
2tem. The present paper uses the same three population projections by extrapolating those
projections beyond 2080.
Regarding the ﬁnancing assumption, the present paper assumes that the payroll tax is
increased and beneﬁts are reduced when the trust funds are depleted, so that each of these
policy changes covers a half of the deﬁcit and that the trust funds are kept at zero thereafter.3
Then, the paper shows the effect of alternative ﬁnancing assumptions—the payroll tax
is increased when the trust funds are depleted but beneﬁts are kept at the current-law level;
alternatively, beneﬁts are reduced when the trust funds are depleted but the payroll tax rate
is kept at the current-law level; and, ﬁnally, the payroll tax rate is increased immediately in
2004 by 10 percent.
The rest of the government budget, which includes Medicare and Medicaid, are made as
simple as possible. The government budget is balanced by adjusting government consump-
tion, which is not in the utility function of the model, so that the per-capita government net
wealth grows at the same rate of the productivity growth.4
Compared to a balanced growth path, private savings and saving rates in the aging base-
line decline throughout the period of 2004-2200, but per-capita private wealth increases be-
cause of the improved longevity and larger life cycle savings. Per-capita labor supply also
increases until 2013, then, decreases monotonically to a level below that in 2004.
The capital-labor ratio rises in the aging baseline economy, and as a result, the interest
rate falls and the wage rate rises signiﬁcantly as the population ages. How much these factor
prices will change depends on the population projection and the ﬁnancing assumption. One
of the interesting ﬁndings from the numerical experiments is that an immediate increase in
the payroll tax rate might not improve the welfare of future generations, although the trust
funds would last much longer.
The present paper is not the ﬁrst one that calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium OLG
modelto anagingsociety. AuerbachandKotlikoff(1987)analyzedtheeffectsoftwostylized
3In a stationary economy, the baseline is often an economy under the current law. The present paper chooses
the ﬁnancing assumption for the baseline such that the government keeps the current-law Social Security system
as reasonably long as possible without affecting the rest of the government budget, although the trust funds are
merely an accounting device and the government does not have to change the law in that timing.
4There are some alternative assumptions. For example, the government consumption is population indexed,
and individual income tax rates are adjusted so that the rest of the government budget is balanced.
3aging populations on the saving rate and Social Security system, using a representative-agent
overlapping generations model. More recently, De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent (1999)
analyzed Social Security reform plans by solving their model for years between 1975 and
2200.5 Ríos-Rull.(2000) calibrates a model to the Spanish economy with a stylized aging
population. Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) and Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003)
analyze the effect of demographic changes in the United States.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 describes the model economy;
Section 3 shows the calibration of the model; Section 4 shows the baseline economy with an
aging population; Section 5 shows a few simple policy experiments; and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2M o d e l
The base model used in the presentpaper is a standard overlapping generations growth model
with uninsurable idiosyncratic working ability shocks and mortality shocks.6 The economy
consists of heterogeneous households, a perfectly competitive representative ﬁrm, and a gov-
ernment with a full commitment technology. Time is discrete, and a period of the model
corresponds to a year. Regarding the openness of the economy, the present paper assumes
two polar cases—a closed economy and a small open economy.
TheHousehold’sProblem. Householdsareheterogeneouswithrespecttotheirages, work-
ing abilities, asset holdings, and working histories. For simplicity, all households are as-
sumed to be two-earner married couples of the same age, who make their decisions jointly.
Every year, a large number of new households of age 20 enter into the economy. A
household of age i receives idiosyncratic working ability shock, ei, at the beginning of each
year t, and chooses its optimal consumption ci, working hours hi, and end-of-period wealth
holding ai+1, taking a government policy rule Ψt, a population projection Φt, and a series
5The main differences between De Nardi et al. (1999) and the present paper are as follows: The former uses
a quadratic utility function so that the household’s decision rules and the laws of motion are expressed by linear
functions; assumes idiosyncratic endowment shocks rather than working ability shocks; and assumes that labor
income tax or consumption tax is adjusted once in 10 years.
6The base model is similar to those in Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1996), and many others, although Aiya-
gari (1994) assumed inﬁnitely-lived agents. The model is also an extension of that in Nishiyama (2002) and
Nishiyama and Smetters (2003).
4of factor prices and policy variables Ωt,a sg i v e n . 7 At the end of each year, a fraction 1−φi,t
of households die. Households are possibly alive until age 120, and the survival rate at the
end of age 120, φ120,t,i sa s s u m e dt ob ez e r o .
Let si denote the individual state of an age i household,
si =( i,ei,a i,b i), (1)
where i ∈ I = {(0,...,19,)2 0 ,...,120} is the household’s age,8 ei ∈ E =[ emin,e max] is
its working ability (measured by its hourly wage), ai ∈ A =[ amin,a max] is its beginning-
of-period asset holding, and bi ∈ B =[ bmin,b max] is its average historical earnings.9 Let St
denote the state of the economy at the beginning of year t,
St =( xt (si),W S,t,W G,t), (2)
where xt (si) is the measure of households for si ∈ I ×E×A×B,10 WS,t is the beginning-
of-period Social Security trust funds, and WG,t is the rest of the government net wealth. Let
Ψt denote the government policy rule known at the beginning of year t,11
Ψt = {WS,t+1,W G,s+1,τPO,s(.),τPH,s(.),tr SS,s(.),τI,s(.),C G,s}
∞
s=t, (3)
where τPO,s(.) is a payroll tax function for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance (OASDI), τPH,s(.) is a payroll tax function for the Hospital Insurance (HI), trSS,s(.)
is an OASDI beneﬁt function, τI,s(.) is a progressive income tax function, and CG,s is gov-
ernment’s consumption. In the present model, government consumption, CG,t, is not in the
utility function of a household.
7The government does not solve its optimization problem to determine the policy. The government policy
rule Ψt is equivalent with its ﬁnancing rule regarding the Social Security budget and the rest of the government
budget, which is assumed to be credible. The population projection Φt is deterministic. Because there are no
aggregate shocks in this economy, households can perfectly foresight a series of future factor prices and policy
variables Ωt based on the information currently available.
8Ages i ≤ 19 are used to calculate the average number of dependent children and the population of age 20
households in each year t.
9The average historical earnings bi are the approximation of the Average Monthly Indexed Earnings (AIME)
multiplied by 12 and used to calculate the household’s Social Security beneﬁts in the model.
10In other words, xt (si) is the joint distribution of households in year t multiplied by the population in year t.
11At least one of the series in Ψt is unknown to the households. In the policy experiments below, the govern-
ment announces that it will increase the payroll tax and reduce beneﬁts when the trust funds are depleted, so that
the trust funds will not be negative. Although the government does not announce explicitly when and how much
it will change the payroll tax rate and beneﬁts, households in the model expect rationally the timing and sizes of
those changes.
5The household’s problem is
v(si,St;Ψt,Φt)= m a x
ci,hi,ai+1





{wteihi +( 1+rt)ai − τI,t(wteihi,r tai,tr SS,t(i,bi)) (5)
−τPO,t(wteihi) − τPH,t(wteihi)+trSS,t(i,bi) − ci} ≥ amin,
a20 =0 ,a 121 ≥ 0,
where ui(.) is a period utility function of an age i household, β is the time-preference factor,
φi,t is the survival rate at the end of age i, wt is the wage rate, and rt is the real rate of return
to capital.12 Individual variables, except for working hours, are normalized by the steady-
state per capita growth rate µ.L e tπi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei) denote the conditional probability for the




v(si+1,St+1)πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei)dei+1. (6)
At the beginning of the next period, the state of the household and the state of the econ-
omy become
si+1 =( i +1 ,e i+1,a i+1 + qt,b i+1) with πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei), (7)
St+1 =( xt+1 (.),W S,t+1,W G,t+1), (8)
where qt denotes accidental bequests that a household receives at the end of the period,
and WS,t+1 and WG,t+1 are determined by the government budget constraints. The average
historical earnings bi follows
bi+1 =

   
   




wt−1 + min(wteihi/2,weh max
t )} if 25 ≤ i ≤ 59
(1 + µ)−1bi if i ≥ 60,
(9)
12The variable wt is the wage rate per efﬁciency unit of labor, which is normalized to unity in 2001, and wtei
denotes the hourly wage of each household of age i with working ability ei in year t. The variable rt is the
pre-tax real market rates of return to capital, which is around 6.25 percent in 2003 in the model. The real rates of
return to the Social Security trust funds are adjusted to 3.0 percent in 2003 so that the present model generates
projections similar to those of the Trustees Report.
6where wehmax
t is the OASDI payroll tax cap. Under the current law, the Average Indexed
MonthlyEarnings(AIME)is calculatedfromthehighest 35 yearsofearnings. Forsimplicity,
the model assumes that the highest 35 years of earnings correspond to those years of age
between 25 and 59.13
The decision rule of households is shown as
d(si,St;Ψt,Φt)={ci (si,St;Ψt,Φt),h i (si,St;Ψt,Φt),a i+1 (si,St;Ψt,Φt)},
for i =2 0 ,...,120.14
TheMeasureofHouseholds. Letxt (si)denotethemeasureofhouseholds, andletXt (si)
be the corresponding cumulative measure. The measure of households is adjusted by the
l o n g - r u np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t eν.
The measure of new born people in year t +1is calculated, if it is not exogenously








where s0 =( 0 ,−,0,0).15 Then, the measures of people of ages 1, ..., 19 are calculated from






dXt (si) for i ≤ 19, (11)
where si =( i,−,0,0). A household of age 20 is assumed to have no initial wealth and
working history. So,
 
E dXt (20,e 20,0,0) is the population of age 20 households in year t.
Let 1[a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y a n d0i fa  = y. The law of motion
13Earnings before age 60 are wage indexed and earnings after age 60 are price indexed. The approximation of
AIME by the average historical earnings follows previous Social Security literature, for example, Huggett and
Ventura (1999) and De Nardi et. al. (1999).
14The departure from the previous literature is simply that the household’s decision depends not only on its
own state, the sate of the economy, and the government policy rule, but also the household’s belief (perfect
foresight) on the population transition.
15The measure of new born people is equal to the new born population divided by 2, because the decision
unit in the model economy is a married couple. In the present paper, Equation (10) is used to extrapolate the
population projections in Social Security Administration (2003) beyond 2080.








For simplicity, accidental bequests, qt,d u et ou n c e r t a i nl i f es p a na r ec a p t u r e db yt h eg o v e r n -
ment and distributed to all surviving working-age households in a lump-sum manner.16
The Firm’s Problem. National wealth Wt is the sum of total private wealth, the Social
Security trust funds WS,t, and the rest of the government net wealth WG,t. Total labor supply












ei hi(si,St;Ψt,Φt)dXt (si). (14)
In a closed economy, capital stock Kt is equal to national wealth, that is, Kt = Wt, and
gross national product Yt is determined by a constant-returns-to-scale production function,17
Yt = F(Kt,L t). (15)
The proﬁt-maximizing condition of the representative ﬁrm is
FK(Kt,L t)=rt + δ, (16)
FL(Kt,L t)=( 1+τ 
PO,t+ τ 
PH,t)wt, (17)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and τ 
PO,t+ τ 
PH,tis the marginal payroll tax rate
for the representative ﬁrm.18
16Some of the computationally feasible extensions of the treatment of accidental bequests are, ﬁrst, assuming
age-dependent accidental bequest receipts based on the average age difference between parents and children;
and, second, making accidental bequest receipts stochastic, i.e., the wealth left by a deceased household is given
to another relatively young household by lottery.
17In a closed economy, gross national product equals gross domestic product.




PH,t)wt denotes the cost of an efﬁciency unit of labor for the ﬁrm. For high income




PH,tis 0.0145 rather than 0.0765
under the current law. In the calibration below, it is assumed to be 0.0594 so that the goods market clear in 2001.
8In a small open economy, factor prices r∗
t and w∗
t are ﬁxed at the international levels of
those, and domestic capital stock KD,t and labor supply Lt are determined so that the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximizing condition satisﬁes, that is,
FK(KD,t,L t)=r∗
t + δ, (18)




Gross domestic product YD,t and gross national product Yt are calculated as
YD,t = F(KD,t,L t), (20)
Yt =( r∗





The Government’s Policy Rule. Government tax revenue consists of income tax, TI,t,




















For the computational convenience, the payroll tax functions, τPO,t(.) and τPH,t(.),a r ea s -
sumed to show the taxes levied on employees (married couples) only. Because the same
taxes are also levied on employers, the aggregate tax revenues in equations (23) and (24) are
multiplied by 2.






trSS,t(i,bi)d Xt (si). (25)
9The laws of motion of the trust funds and the rest of government net wealth—both of those








{(1 + rt)WG,t + TI,t + TPH,t− CG,t}. (27)
DeﬁnitionRecursiveCompetitiveEquilibrium(EquilibriumTransitionPath): Letsi =
(i,ei,a i,b i) be the individual state of households, let St =( xt(si),W S,t,W G,t) be the ag-
gregate state of the economy, let Ψt be the government policy rule known at the beginning
of year t,
Ψt = {WS,t+1,W G,s+1,τPO,s(.),τPH,s(.),tr SS,s(.),τI,s(.),C G,s}∞
s=t,
and let Φt be the perfect-foresight population projection. A series of factor prices, acciden-
tal bequests, the government policy variables, and the parameters ϕs of government policy
functions,
Ωt={rs,w s,q s,W S,s+1,W G,s+1,C G,s,ϕs}∞
s=t;
the value function of households, {v(si,Ss;Ψs,Φs)}∞
s=t; the decision rule of households,
{d(si,Ss;Ψs,Φs)}∞
s=t = {ci(si,Ss;Ψs,Φs),h i(si,Ss;Ψs,Φs),a i+1(si,Ss;Ψs,Φs)}∞
s=t;
and the measure of households, {xs(si)}∞
s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, in
every year s = t,...,∞, each household solves the utility maximization problem (1) – (5)
taking Ψt and Φt as given; the ﬁrm solves the proﬁt maximization problem, and the capital
and labor markets clear, that is, (13) – (19) hold; the government policy rules satisfy (22) –
(27); and the goods market clears.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
This section explains the procedure, assumption, and parameterization of the model to con-
struct baseline economies with an aging population as equilibrium transition paths.
103.1 The Procedure
Since an economy with an aging population is not stationary, it is constructed as an equilib-
rium transition path from 1961 through 2200. The ﬁnal year 2200 of the transition path is
assumed to be in a steady state.19
1. Calibrate the model described in Section 2 to the 2001 U.S. economy as if it is in a
steady state, using the actual age-population distribution and mortality rates in 2001.20
Choose the time preference factor β and the share parameter for consumption α in
the utility function so that the steady-state economy is consistent with the 2001 U.S.
economy with respect to the capital-output ratio and the average annual working hours
of households. Also choose total factor productivity A so that the wage rate w is
normalized to unity.
2. Calibrate the model to the 1961 U.S. economy as if it is in a steady state, using the
actual age-population distribution and mortality rates in 1961 and the parameters β, α,
and A obtained in the previous step.21 Choose the parameters in the OASDI payroll
tax function and OASDI beneﬁt function so that total OASDI tax revenue and beneﬁt
expenditure in the model economy are equal to those in 1961 as percentages of GDP.
3. Solve the model for an equilibrium transition path from 1961 through 2200, using the
same parameters β, α,a n dA, and the population projection through 2200. For years
between 1961 and 2002, choose the parameters in the payroll tax function and the
beneﬁt function, and the rate of return to the trust funds so that those are consistent
with the data as percentages of GDP.22
19In the ﬁnal version of the paper, I am planning to solve the model through 2300 for more accurate computa-
tion of the economy.
20Tosolvethemodelforasteady-stateequilibriumusinganpopulationdistributionandmortalityratesin2001,
we have to assume the households in the model falsely believe that the population distribution is stationary.
21Again, to solve the model for a steady-state equilibrium using an population distribution and mortality
rates in 1961, we have to assume the households in the model falsely believe that the population distribution is
stationary. This assumption is probably acceptable because this step is merely a preparation for constructing a
model economy in 2004-2200.
22For policy experiments, we solve the model for equilibrium transition paths in 2004-2200, using the state of
the economy in 2004.
113.2 The Government Policy Rule Ψt
Regarding the government policy rule,
Ψt = {WS,s+1,W G,s+1,τPO,s(.),τPH,s(.),tr SS,s(.),τI,s(.),C G,s}∞
s=t,
in the baseline economy with an aging population, the present paper makes the following
ﬁnancing assumptions.
3.2.1 The Social Security (OASDI) Budget
The OASDI surplus—the difference between the OASDI payroll tax revenue, TPO,t, and the
beneﬁt expenditure, TrSS,t—is added to the Social Security trust funds, WS,t, as long as the




max{(1 + rt)WS,t + TPO,t− TrSS,t,0},
for all t if WS,s > 0 for all s ≤ t.23 Once the trust funds are depleted, the trust funds are kept
at zero thereafter, and either the payroll tax rate is raised, or the beneﬁt replacement rates are
reduced proportionally, or both by splitting the deﬁcit evenly,24 to close the intertemporal
budget constraint of Social Security. That is,
WS,t+1 =0 ,
TrSS,t − TPO,t =( 1+rt)WS,t,
for all t if there exists WS,s =0for s ≤ t +1 . If the trust funds are not depleted before
2104 (100 years from now), to obtain the ﬁnal steady-state equilibrium, the trust funds are
kept at the same level (after growth adjustments) thereafter, and either the payroll tax rate or
the beneﬁt replacement rates or both of those are changed to close the inter-temporal budget
constraint. That is,
WS,t+1 = WS,t,
TrSS,t − TPO,t = {(1 + rt) − (1 + µ)(1+ν)}WS,t,
for all t ≥ 2104 if WS,s > 0 for all s ≤ 2104.
23All aggregate variables in the model are normalized using the steady-state (long-run) growth rate µ and
population growth rate ν.
24In the baseline economy, the present paper assumes that, when the trust funds are depleted, both the payroll
tax rate is raised and the OASDI replacement rates are reduced to cover the deﬁcit evenly.




0-99 by age The 2003 Trustees Report Extrapolated
100-120 in total Alternatives I, II, and III
100-120 by age Estimated
3.2.2 The Rest of the Government Budget
The rest of the government net wealth WG,t is simply assumed to grow at the same rate as





To close the rest of the government intertemporal budget constraint, government consump-
tion is obtained as the residual,25
CG,t =( 1+rt)WG,t − (1 + µ)(1+ν)WG,t+1 + TI,t + TPH,t.
For years before 2004, the present paper assumes that the Social Security budget is combined
with the rest of the government budget, or the trust funds are not pre-funded. That is,
WS,t+1 + WG,t+1 =
1
(1 + µ)(1+ν)
(1 + µ)(1+νt)(WS,t + WG,t),
and
CG,t =( 1+rt)(WS,t + WG,t) − (1 + µ)(1+ν)(WS,t+1 + WG,t+1)
+ TI,t + TPO,t+ TPH,t− TrSS,t.
3.3 The Population Projection Φt
The present paper uses the population projections—alternative II (intermediate), alternative
I (low cost), and alternative III (high cost)— in Social Security Administration (2003). The
25We can alternatively assume that either income tax or the payroll tax for HI are changed to close the budget
constraint. The present paper focuses mainly on the Social Security (OASDI) budget and tries to avoid the policy
inﬂuence from the rest of the government budget.
13Table 2: Age-Speciﬁc Fertility Rates (Per 1,000 Females, 2003)
Age of Females Year 2003 Year 2080-2200
15-19 57.0 57.0 ×ϕf,t
20-24 112.6 112.6 ×ϕf,t
25-29 113.1 113.1 ×ϕf,t
30-34 85.0 85.0 ×ϕf,t
35-39 35.6 35.6 ×ϕf,t
40-44 7.0 7.0 ×ϕf,t
45-49 0.3 0.3 ×ϕf,t
Total Fertility Rate 2.07
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2003). In the model, the adjustment factorϕf,t
of fertility rates and corresponding total fertility rate in 2080-2200 are 1.0581
and 2.19, respectively, in Alternative I, 0.9441 and 1.95 in Alternative II, and
0.8294 and 1.72 in Alternative III. In all three assumptions, the sex ratio at
birth (male per female) is 1.0498 in 2080-2200.
Social Security Administration projected the population distributions until 2080. As Table
1 shows, the populations in 2081-2200 are extrapolated, using the age-speciﬁc fertility rates
of women of ages 15-49 in 2003 and an adjustment factor ϕf,t = ϕf,2080. (See Table 2.)
The adjustment factor is calculated for each population projection to match the total fertility
rate in 2080.26 The age-population distributions in 1961 and 2001, and the projections in
selected years (every 25 years from 2003, and 2200) are shown in Figure 1. The long-run
annual population growth rates ν of the population projection alternatives I, II, and III are
0.594%, 0.154%, and -0.312%, respectively.27
The survival rates φi,t of households at the end of age i in year t are simply calculated
from the population projection. For people below age 45, φi,t tend to be greater than one
because the projections include immigrations.
Figure 2 shows the population share of elderly people (aged 65 or above) and the ratio of
the working-age (aged 20-64) population to the elderly population for three alternative popu-
lation projections. The latter ratio rises very slightly until year 2006, then falls monotonically
(except for Alternative I) thereafter.
26In addition, the populations of people 100-120 years of age in 1961-2080 are estimated, using the population
data in 1941-1960 and mortality rates in 1998 with proportionate year adjustments, so that the total populations
of ages 100-120 are equal to the numbers in the Trustees’ projection.
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Figure 1: Population Projections in Selected Years: Author’s calculation from the data in
Social Security Administration (2003)

































Alternative I Alternative II
Alternative III
Figure 2: The Share of Elderly People: Author’s calculation from the data in Social Security
Administration (2003)
Table 3: Parameters
Time preference parameter β 1.013
Share parameter for consumption α 0.686
Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ 4.0
Capital share of output θ 0.300
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.047
Long-term real growth rate µ 0.018
Long-term population growth rate ν 0.00594, 0.00154, -0.00312
Total factor productivity A 0.982
3.4 The 2001 Steady-State Economy
Table 3 summarizes the parameter choices. For the 2001 steady-state economy, the degree of
time preference β is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 2.74, total factor productivity A
is chosen so that the wage rate w equals unity, and the share parameter for consumption α is
chosen so that the average annual working hours of married couples aged between 20 and 64
are 3,368 hours. The capital share parameter θ of the production function and depreciation
rate δ are calculated from macroeconomic statistics.
The following sections describe the choice of functional forms and parameter values, and
the choice of target variables and values.
16Household’s Utility Function. The model has elastic labor supply and uses the following
Cobb-Douglas utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), which is com-









where γ is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, ni is the number of dependent children,
ζ is the consumption adjustment parameter, and hmax
i is the maximum working hours. The
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be 4.0, following Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987).28 In this setting, the growth-adjusted β becomes β(1 + µ)α(1−γ), which is 0.976 in
the calibration. The numbers of dependent children by parents’ age are calculated from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1993 Family Data (see Table 4). Multiplying these
numbers by a time-variant adjustment factor ϕn,t, the model calculates the average number
of children of ages 0-19, ni,i na na g ei household, which is consistent with each of three
population projections. The consumption adjustment parameter is assumed to be 0.6.29
The annual working hours in the model are the sum of the working hours of a husband
and a wife. The average working hours of married households between ages 20 and 64 are
3,368 hours in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The maximum working hours
hmax
i are set to be 5,460 for all households, which is the 95th percentile in the same survey.
In this calibration, the parameter α is chosen to be 0.686 so that average working hours of
age 20 and age 64 become 3,368 hours in the 2001 steady-state economy.30
Working Ability. The working ability in this calibration corresponds to the hourly wage
(labor income per hour) of each household in the 1998 SCF. The average hourly wage of a
28There is no strong consensus about the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ. For the estimates of γ in
previous literature, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Prescott (1986). Citing these two papers, Huggett
(1996) used γ of 1.5 and 3.0. More recently, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimated γ varying between 0.5 and
1.4, and Laitner (2003) estimated γ at 2.3 or 2.0.
29Since 2
0.6 =1 .516, a married couple with two dependent children consume about 52 percent more than a
married couple with no children if other things are equal. This increase is slightly smaller than the assumption
in Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) but larger than the estimates in Laitner (2003).
30In a separate policy experiment not shown in the present paper, we found that the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply is about 0.15 in the short run under this utility parameter setting.
17Table 4: Number of People Under 18 Years of Age in a Married Household
Age of Number of people Age of Number of people Age of Number of people
parents under age 18 parents under age 18 parents under age 18
20 1.02 35 1.83 50 0.61
21 0.96 36 1.87 51 0.50
22 0.98 37 1.90 52 0.42
23 0.89 38 1.96 53 0.35
24 0.96 39 1.85 54 0.29
25 1.08 40 1.76 55 0.23
26 1.12 41 1.75 56 0.22
27 1.15 42 1.66 57 0.19
28 1.19 43 1.51 58 0.15
29 1.29 44 1.43 59 0.15
30 1.36 45 1.30 60 0.13
31 1.49 46 1.13 61 0.09
32 1.60 47 0.96 62 0.10
33 1.68 48 0.82 63 0.10
34 1.77 49 0.70 64 0.09
Source: Author’s calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1993 Family Data.
In the model, these numbers are multiplied by an adjustment factor ϕn,tto be consistent with
t h ep o p u l a t i o no fa g e s0 - 1 9i ne a c hy e a rt.
married couple (family members #1 and #2 in SCF) used for the calibration is calculated by
Hourly Wage =
Regular and Additional Salaries (#1 + #2) + Welfare or Assistance
max{Working Hours (#1 + #2), 520}
.
To capture the earnings risk a household is exposed to more precisely, unemployment or
worker’s compensation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps,
andotherforms ofwelfareorassistanceareaddedto thesalariesbeforecalculating thehourly
wage. Table 5 shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of ﬁve-year age cohorts.31
Using a shape-preserving cubic spline interpolation, the working ability of each age from 20
to 79 is obtained. The average hourly earnings of production workers have increased by 16.7
percent during the years from 1997 to 2001.32 In the calibration, the numbers in the table are
multiplied by 1.167 to convert the hourly wages in 1997 into those in 2001.
31Here, the hourlywage of a household that works less than520 hours (10 hours a weekper couple) is assumed
to be zero. In the real economy, some households have fairly high working ability but choose not to work (for
example, because of schooling). One observation of the age 20-24 cohort, which has an hourly wage of $193.01,
is ignored.
32Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
18Table 5: Working Abilities of a Household (in U.S. Dollars per Hour)
Percentile Age cohorts
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 0-20th 3.83 5.42 5.42 6.93 6.12 6.59
e2 20-40th 7.07 8.64 9.76 11.28 11.36 12.70
e3 40-60th 8.68 10.91 13.46 15.01 15.59 17.22
e4 60-80th 10.67 14.01 18.08 19.96 22.09 23.22
e5 80-90th 14.05 17.52 27.17 25.27 30.89 31.58
e6 90-95th 18.20 22.48 33.71 33.38 48.59 44.31
e7 95-99th 28.43 32.64 54.11 52.16 76.13 86.50
e8 99-100th 36.81 46.09 167.15 186.47 221.34 301.99
Percentile Age cohorts
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 0-20th 5.48 3.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
e2 20-40th 11.53 10.06 4.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
e3 40-60th 16.16 14.26 11.18 2.82 0.00 0.00
e4 60-80th 23.44 21.28 18.16 10.37 1.81 0.00
e5 80-90th 32.14 30.93 28.56 19.48 12.57 0.00
e6 90-95th 43.01 44.10 59.36 27.68 29.03 1.96
e7 95-99th 78.61 85.29 96.22 59.34 64.91 14.25
e8 99-100th 314.59 379.44 421.55 299.25 195.73 146.14
Source: Nishiyama and Smetters (2003). The authors’ calculations from the
1998 SCF data.
Markov Transition Matrix. The Markov transition matrix, Γ, of working ability is cal-
culated from the hourly wage of people ages 30-39 in 1991 in the PSID individual data. To
make the working ability process more persistent, the matrix is calculated as the transition
from the average of years 1989 and 1990 to the average of years 1990 and 1991.
Γ =

                  

0.7674 0.2049 0.0183 0.0045 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1810 0.6033 0.1844 0.0129 0.0000 0.0086 0.0046 0.0052
0.0388 0.1517 0.6768 0.1220 0.0011 0.0046 0.0050 0.0000
0.0126 0.0361 0.1039 0.7210 0.0980 0.0139 0.0145 0.0000
0.0000 0.0081 0.0332 0.2360 0.6306 0.0676 0.0145 0.0100
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0582 0.3224 0.5303 0.0891 0.0000
0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0354 0.0000 0.2827 0.6433 0.0379
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3553 0.6447

                  

,
19where Γ(j,k)=π(ei+1 = ek
i+1 |ei = e
j
i).




To compute GNP, the model uses the sum of working hours in efﬁciency units as total labor
supply Lt. The capital share of output θ is chosen by
θ =1−
Compensation of Employees +( 1− θ) × Proprietors’ Income
National Income + Consumption of Fixed Capital
.
The number of θ in 2000 is 0.30.33 The annual growth rate µ is assumed to be 1.8 percent.
Total factor productivity A is chosen to be 0.982 so that the wage per unit of efﬁcient labor
is normalized to be unity.
Fixed Capital and Private Wealth. Fixed capital K is the sum of private ﬁxed assets and
government ﬁxed assets. In 2000, private ﬁxed assets are $21,165 billion, government ﬁxed
assets are $5,743 billion, and the government debt held by the public is $3,410 billion.34
From these numbers, the government net wealth is set to a 9.5 percent of total private wealth
in the initial steady-state economy. In 2000, the capital-GDP ratio is 2.74. The time pref-
erence parameter β is chosen so that the capital-GDP ratio of the steady state economy (a
balanced growth path) is 2.74.




− µ − ν.
In 2000, private gross ﬁxed investment accounted for 17.2 percent of GDP, and government
(federal and state) gross investment accounted for 3.3 percent of GDP.35 When the capital-
output ratio is 2.74, the ratio of gross investment to ﬁxed capital is 7.5 percent. Subtracting
the productivity and population growth rates, the annual depreciation rate is assumed to be
4.7 percent.
33Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. The average of θ in years between 1996 and 2000 is 0.31.
34ibid..and Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2001).
35ibid.
20Table 6: Marginal Payroll Tax Rates in 2001
Labor Income per Marginal Tax Rate (%)
worker (wteihi/2) OASDI HI
$0 – $80,400 6.2 × ϕτPO 1.45
$80,400 – 0.0 × ϕτPO 1.45
T h es a m ea m o u n to ft a xi sl e v i e dt oe m p l o y e r s .
Table 7: OASDI Replacement Rates in 2001
AIME (b65/12) Marginal Replacement Rate (%)
$0 – $561 90.0 × ϕtrSS
$561 – $3,381 32.0 × ϕtrSS
$3,381 – 15.0 × ϕtrSS
The adjustment factor also reﬂects the DI and survivors insurance.
The Current Law Social Security System. The tax rate levied on both employers and
employees for OASDI is 6.2 percent, and the tax rate for HI is 1.45 percent. In 2001, em-
ployee wages above $80,400 were not taxable for OASDI. (See Table 6.) So, the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt-maximization problem becomes
w × (1+Marginal Payroll Tax Rate) = AFL(K,L),
where the marginal payroll tax rate is either 0.0765 or 0.0145 for high-earnings workers.
Because the marginal payroll tax rates are not uniform across households, the calibration
uses the average payroll tax rate (total payroll tax paid by employers divided by total labor
income) instead, so that the Walras’ law holds. Social Security beneﬁts are calculated from
each worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), b65/12, and the replacement rate
schedule in the United States. (See Table 7.)
In 2001, the OASDI payroll tax revenue was 5.25 percent of GDP, and OASDI beneﬁt
expenditure was 4.28 percent of GDP. In the model, the ratio of statutory payroll tax revenue
to GDP is higher because the model assume all households are two-earner married couples.
T h ep a y r o l lt a xi nt h em o d e li sm u l t i p l i e db ya na d j u s t m e n tf a c t o rϕτPO, which is equal to
0.812, so that the size of payroll tax revenue as a percentage of GDP equals 5.25 percent.
(See Table 9.) In the model, survivors’ beneﬁts and disability insurance are simply assumed
to be proportional to the beneﬁts for old-age workers. The statutory old age beneﬁts in the
21Table 8: Marginal Individual Income Tax Rates in 2001 (Married Household, Filed Jointly)
Taxable Income Marginal Income Tax Rate (%)
$0 – $45,200 15.0 × ϕτI
$45,200 – $109,250 28.0 × ϕτI
$109,250 – $166,500 31.0 × ϕτI
$166,500 – $297,350 36.0 × ϕτI
$297,350 – 39.6 × ϕτI
The standard deduction is $7,600 and exemption per person is $2,900.
model are multiplied by an adjustment factor ϕtrSS, which equals 1.199, so that the size of
OASDI beneﬁts equals 4.28 percent of GDP in 2001.
Federal and Local Income Taxes. Federal income tax and state and local taxes are as-
sumed to be the level in year 2001 before the Bush tax cuts, “Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA).” Every household in the model is assumed to
be a married couple, which is subject to the standard deduction and exemptions. In 2001 the
standard deduction for a married household was $7,600, and the exemption was $2,900 per
person. The exemptions for dependent children follow Table 4. Table 8 shows the statutory
marginal tax rates before EGTRRA.
All of the tax brackets, standard deduction, and exemption are assumed to be growth
adjusted so that there is no real bracket creep throughout the transition path. Because the
economic income of a household is in general larger than taxable income, the effective tax
rates aremuch lower. In 2000, the ratio oftotalprivateincometax to nominalGDPwas0.102
and that of corporate income tax was 0.021. The statutory federal income tax is multiplied
by the adjustment factor ϕτI, which is equal to 0.775, so that income tax revenue (including
corporate income tax) is 12.3 percent of GDP in the 2001 steady-state equilibrium. Also,
since the effective capital income tax rates are lower than labor income tax rates, the tax
function is adjusted so that the tax rate on capital income (including corporate income) is
about 30 percent lower than that of labor income. State and local income tax in the model
is simply a 4.0 percent ﬂat tax for an income (excluding Social Security beneﬁts) above the
same standard deduction and exemptions.
223.5 Equilibrium Transition Paths in 1961–2200
The present paper solves the model for transition paths from 1961 to construct baseline
economies in 2004-2200 under several different assumptions. Rather than implementing
all relevant policy changes in 1961-2003, the present paper considers only the changes in
the OASDI payroll tax, beneﬁts, and the trust funds in this period for simplicity. Table 9
shows the sizes of the OASDI payroll tax revenue and beneﬁt expenditure as percentages of
GDP in 1961-2002. In the model, the adjustment factors, ϕτPO,t and ϕtrSS,t, in the payroll
tax function and beneﬁt function, respectively, are changed in each year so that the sizes of
payroll tax revenue and beneﬁt expenditure in the model are consistent with those in the U.S.
historical data.
The adjustment factors of the OASDI payroll tax function in 2002 are 0.810 in a closed
economy and 0.808 in a small open economy. These numbers are smaller than 1.0, because
the model assumes all households as two-earner married couples and this assumption pushes
up the payroll tax revenue without any adjustments. The adjustment factors of the OASDI
beneﬁt function in 2002 are 1.231 and 1.218. These are about 51-52 percent larger than
those of the payroll tax function, because both survivors’ beneﬁts and disability insurance
are included into the beneﬁts.36 For 2003-2200, the adjustment factors are simply assumed
to be the average of those in 1998-2002.
The Rateof Return tothe Trust Funds. BecausethehistoricalratesofreturntotheSocial
Security trust funds in 1961-2002 are in general different from those generated in the model,
the sizes of the trust funds are adjusted so that those are also consistent with the data as
percentages of GDP. The nominal rates of return to the Social Security trust funds that the
Social Security Administration assumes from 2003 to 2041 are between 5.93 percent and
6.09 percent.37 The Social Security Administration also assumes the CPI inﬂation rate of 3.0
percent from 2007 and 2041.38
36Because there are no health shocks in the model, disabilities insurance beneﬁts are assumed to be entitled to
households 65 years of age and older proportionally to their OASDI beneﬁts.
37These numbers are calculated from the projections of interest income and Social Security assets in Table
VI.F9 in the Trustees Report (available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR03/lr6F9-2.html).
38The CPI inﬂation rates in 2003-2006 are 2.35, 2.39, 2.70, and 2.92 percent. See Table VI.F7 (available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ TR/TR03/lr6F7-2.html).
23Table 9: OASDI Payroll Tax Revenue and Beneﬁt Expenditure
OASDI Payroll Tax Revenue OASDI Beneﬁts Expenditure
As a Percent- Adjustment FactorϕτPO As a Percent- Adjustment FactorϕtrSS
age of GDP Closed Small Open age of GDP Closed Small Open
1961 2.26 0.345 0.344 2.34 0.740 0.729
1962 2.23 0.341 0.340 2.47 0.771 0.761
1963 2.53 0.387 0.386 2.49 0.770 0.759
1964 2.54 0.389 0.387 2.44 0.749 0.739
1965 2.39 0.366 0.364 2.54 0.774 0.764
1966 2.87 0.440 0.439 2.54 0.767 0.756
1967 3.06 0.470 0.468 2.57 0.772 0.762
1968 3.01 0.461 0.460 2.74 0.818 0.810
1969 3.25 0.498 0.497 2.72 0.807 0.800
1970 3.39 0.520 0.518 3.07 0.904 0.897
1971 3.45 0.528 0.527 3.30 0.963 0.956
1972 3.50 0.535 0.534 3.36 0.973 0.967
1973 3.78 0.578 0.577 3.72 1.069 1.064
1974 3.96 0.606 0.604 3.90 1.113 1.108
1975 3.96 0.605 0.603 4.10 1.161 1.157
1976 3.96 0.604 0.603 4.15 1.166 1.163
1977 3.91 0.595 0.594 4.17 1.163 1.161
1978 3.90 0.593 0.592 4.05 1.122 1.121
1979 4.04 0.614 0.613 4.07 1.120 1.121
1980 4.20 0.638 0.637 4.31 1.178 1.179
1981 4.48 0.681 0.680 4.50 1.225 1.226
1982 4.50 0.684 0.683 4.79 1.298 1.300
1983 4.61 0.700 0.699 4.72 1.271 1.273
1984 4.66 0.708 0.707 4.47 1.201 1.202
1985 4.77 0.725 0.724 4.42 1.184 1.184
1986 4.78 0.726 0.725 4.42 1.177 1.178
1987 4.76 0.723 0.722 4.30 1.137 1.138
1988 5.00 0.761 0.760 4.25 1.120 1.120
1989 5.04 0.768 0.767 4.21 1.108 1.108
1990 5.14 0.784 0.783 4.27 1.122 1.121
1991 5.14 0.784 0.783 4.48 1.177 1.177
1992 5.02 0.766 0.765 4.53 1.190 1.190
1993 4.93 0.753 0.752 4.55 1.195 1.194
1994 4.96 0.758 0.757 4.49 1.184 1.182
1995 4.93 0.755 0.754 4.49 1.189 1.186
1996 4.94 0.757 0.756 4.44 1.183 1.178
1997 4.98 0.764 0.763 4.35 1.170 1.164
1998 5.01 0.770 0.769 4.27 1.160 1.153
1999 5.08 0.782 0.781 4.16 1.144 1.136
2000 5.13 0.792 0.790 4.15 1.151 1.141
2001 5.25 0.812 0.810 4.28 1.199 1.188
2002 5.23 0.810 0.808 4.34 1.231 1.218
2003-2200 0.793 0.791 1.177 1.167
Author’s calculation from the data in Table 4A3, Social Security Administration (2002), also available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/t4a3Income.html and http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/t4a3Outgo.html.
OASDI payroll tax revenue used in this table excludes interest income. The adjustment factors in 1961-2002
are calculated so that the sizes of revenue and expenditure are consistent with the historic data as percentages
of GDP. The adjustment factors in 2003-2200 are the averages of those in 1998-2002.
24In this paper, the real market rate of return to capital in a small open economy is ﬁxed at
about 6.25 percent (before capital income and corporate income taxes). The market of return
in 2003 in a closed economy is 6.22 percent, which is roughly equal to that in a small open
economy. So, the model assumes a risk premium of 3.25 percent between the market rate of
return and the rate of return to the trust funds, so that the real rate of return to the trust funds
in 2003 is around 3.0 percent in the model economy.
4 Baseline Economy
Baseline economies are obtained as Equilibrium transition paths with three population pro-
jections, intermediate (alternative II), low cost (alternative I), and high cost (alternative III)
in Social Security Administration (2003).
Table 10 shows aging baseline economies, a closed economy and a small open economy,
with the intermediate population projection (alternative II), in which the long-run population
growth rate ν is 0.154 percent. The Social Security trust funds are depleted in 2053 [2056]
in a closed [small open] economy.39 The model assumes that the OASDI payroll tax rate is
increased and beneﬁt replacement rates are reduced when the trust funds are depleted, so that
each of those policy changes ﬁnances a half of the deﬁcit and that the trust funds are kept
at zero thereafter. The numbers in the table are either percent changes or changes in per-
centage points from the balanced growth path through the economy in 2004 with population
adjustments.
Table 11 shows aging economies with the low cost population projection (alternative I),
in which the long-run population growth rate ν is 0.594 percent. The trust funds are depleted
in 2082 [2100] in a closed [small open] economy. Finally, Table 12 shows aging economies
with the high cost population projection (alternative III), in which the long-run population
growth rate ν is -0.312 percent. With the same government ﬁnancing assumption, the trust
funds are depleted in 2044 [2046] in a closed [small open] economy.
39The trust funds last longer in the present paper than those in Social Security Administration (2003) with all
population projections, partly because the current Social Security system uses the consumer price index (CPI)
for the cost of living adjustment of beneﬁts, and CPI inﬂation rates are higher than personal consumption deﬂator
growth rates. When the cost of living adjustment was modiﬁed in the model, the trust funds would be depleted
in 2045 [2047] under the population projection alternative II in a closed [small open] economy.
25Table 10: The Equilibrium Transition Path with an Aging Population Alternative II (Changes
from the population-adjusted balanced growth path through 2004)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 21.4 22.7 26.1 26.1 13.3 21.6 24.9 19.9
%ch(Labor Supply) -1.0 -2.7 -4.1 -4.9 1.2 -2.2 -3.4 -1.5
%ch(GNP) 5.3 4.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.4
%ch(Consumption) 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.1 4.2 7.3 7.2 6.2
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -1.98 -1.81 -2.69 -3.03 -0.90 -1.74 -2.42 -1.69
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.17 -0.21 0.72 0.85 -0.11 -0.16 0.60 0.11
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.33 1.79 1.84 1.97 0.35 1.94 1.73 1.34
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 13.1 -13.5 -14.0 -14.0 9.9 0.2 -14.0 -1.3
ch(Interest Rate%) -1.44 -1.63 -1.90 -1.95 -0.80 -1.54 -1.79 -1.38
%ch(Wage Rate) 6.3 6.9 7.9 8.0 3.4 6.8 7.4 5.9
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 25.3 29.8 34.4 35.4 14.8 27.7 32.5 25.0
%ch(Labor Supply) -2.9 -4.9 -7.0 -7.9 0.1 -4.4 -6.1 -3.5
%ch(GNP) 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.1
%ch(Consumption) 6.5 8.2 8.5 8.8 3.7 7.6 8.2 6.5
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.87 -0.01 -1.44 -1.88 -0.23 -0.68 -1.05 -0.65
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.12 -0.13 0.95 1.07 -0.07 -0.12 0.73 0.18
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.64 2.48 2.06 2.18 0.51 2.25 2.02 1.59
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 17.3 -8.1 -14.0 -14.0 11.6 5.7 -13.6 1.2
Percent changes or changes in percentage points from the balanced growth path of 1.8% per-capita real
growth through the 2004 economy. Years 2028, 2053, and 2078 are the 25th, 50th, and 75th years,
respectively, from 2004. The trust funds are depleted in 2053 in a closed economy and 2056 in a small
open economy. When the trust funds are depleted, both the payroll tax rate is raised and beneﬁts are cut
to balance the OASDI thereafter.
With all population projections, per-capita national wealth is larger in aging economies
than in the balanced growth path. With population projections alternative II and alternative
III, per-capita national wealth grows faster than per-capita GDP. Because households need to
accumulate larger life-cycle savings forthe period after retirement, expecting lower mortality
rates, lower Social Security beneﬁts, and higher payroll tax rates. Contrary to the forecasts
calculated from a model with ﬁxed saving rates by age cohort, the severer aging population
results in larger private wealth per household.40
Labor supply tends to be smaller in aging economies than in the balanced growth path.
40The present paper does not consider the increase in government debt due to the increase in Medicare spend-
ing caused by an aging population. The results will change if we assume the ﬁnancing rule for the rest of the
government budget differently.
26Table 11: The Equilibrium Transition Path with an Aging Population Alternative I (Changes
from the population-adjusted balanced growth path through 2004)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 15.4 9.2 6.4 5.9 10.7 11.8 7.5 10.0
%ch(Labor Supply) -3.0 -5.6 -5.8 -6.2 0.3 -4.9 -5.8 -3.5
%ch(GNP) 2.2 -1.3 -2.3 -2.7 3.2 -0.2 -2.0 0.3
%ch(Consumption) 4.8 3.0 2.6 2.4 3.3 3.9 2.7 3.3
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -2.64 -2.52 -2.05 -2.47 -1.19 -2.73 -2.27 -2.06
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 0.18 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.09 1.47 1.49 1.30 0.26 1.45 1.53 1.08
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 15.7 1.9 -11.7 -14.0 10.7 8.6 -5.4 4.6
ch(Interest Rate%) -1.25 -1.06 -0.90 -0.89 -0.71 -1.17 -0.97 -0.95
%ch(Wage Rate) 5.4 4.5 3.7 3.5 3.0 5.0 4.1 4.0
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 19.0 15.4 12.3 9.4 12.1 17.1 13.7 14.3
%ch(Labor Supply) -4.5 -6.9 -7.0 -7.3 -0.6 -6.4 -7.1 -4.7
%ch(GNP) 2.5 -0.2 -1.2 -2.3 3.2 0.7 -0.9 1.0
%ch(Consumption) 4.4 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.9 4.0 3.2 3.4
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -1.91 -2.23 -1.99 -2.17 -0.70 -2.27 -2.10 -1.69
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.24 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.33 1.57 1.56 1.35 0.39 1.61 1.61 1.20
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 19.6 10.2 -1.4 -14.1 12.2 14.9 4.2 10.4
See footnotes of Table 10.
The trust funds are depleted in 2082 in a closed economy and 2100 in a small open economy.
With the population projection alternative II, per-capita labor supply increases relative to the
balanced growth path until 2013 [2012] in a closed [small open] economy, then, it decreases
relative to the balanced growth path thereafter. Although the retirement decision is endoge-
nous in the model, the increase in the population share of aged 65 or older decreases the
average working hours of households in the long run. Under the most severe assumption of
population aging (alternative III), per-capita labor supply increases slightly on average for
the ﬁrst 75 years in a closed economy, because households have to work more to prepare for
the earlier and larger reduction of OASDI beneﬁts. But, this is not the case in a small open
economy, in which the wage rate is ﬁxed.
There are two effects of an aging population on the capital-labor ratio. First, an aging
population increases life-cycle savings accumulated for longer periods after retirements, and
an aging population reduces per-capita labor supply because a larger share of households are
27Table 12: The Equilibrium Transition Path with an Aging Population Alternative III
(Changes from the population-adjusted balanced growth path through 2004)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 29.4 42.8 51.8 50.5 16.7 35.7 49.0 33.8
%ch(Labor Supply) 1.3 0.2 -3.9 -6.0 2.2 0.5 -1.7 0.4
%ch(GNP) 9.0 11.4 10.2 8.3 6.3 10.0 11.4 9.2
%ch(Consumption) 8.7 10.8 10.8 10.0 4.9 10.2 11.0 8.7
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.84 -1.34 -2.91 -3.62 -0.36 -0.77 -2.04 -1.06
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.20 0.77 1.49 1.79 -0.12 0.12 1.14 0.38
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.55 1.89 2.61 2.92 0.43 2.09 2.26 1.60
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 10.1 -13.9 -13.9 -13.9 9.0 -5.6 -13.9 -3.5
ch(Interest Rate%) -1.71 -2.38 -2.97 -3.04 -0.93 -2.05 -2.73 -1.90
%ch(Wage Rate) 7.6 10.4 13.2 13.4 4.0 9.1 12.1 8.4
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 33.8 52.2 66.5 69.9 18.4 43.0 61.1 40.9
%ch(Labor Supply) -1.2 -4.0 -9.0 -11.4 0.9 -2.8 -6.4 -2.8
%ch(GNP) 9.5 13.1 13.9 13.3 6.2 11.2 14.1 10.5
%ch(Consumption) 8.3 12.3 14.5 15.5 4.4 10.9 13.5 9.6
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) 0.91 1.18 0.21 -0.98 0.58 1.50 0.93 1.00
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) -0.13 1.15 2.74 2.30 -0.08 0.22 1.62 0.59
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 1.96 2.25 3.14 3.40 0.63 2.59 2.72 1.98
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 14.7 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 10.9 -2.4 -14.0 -1.8
See footnotes of Table 10.
The trust funds are depleted in 2044 in a closed economy and 2046 in a small open economy.
retired. This effect increases the capital-labor ratio of the economy.
Second, under the ﬁnancing assumption, in which the payroll tax rate is increased to
make the Social Security system sustainable, an aging population increases the lifetime pay-
roll tax payments and lifetime beneﬁt receipts of households and, accordingly, it reduces
private savings.41 This effect tends to decrease the capital-labor ratio.
When the initial size of the Social Security system—the average replacement rate of
OASI beneﬁts—is relatively small, the ﬁrst effect is larger than the second one, and the
capital-labor ratio rises as a population ages. When the initial size of Social Security is
relatively large, the capital-labor ratio possibly falls.
In the present model and parameter settings, the ﬁrst effect on the capital-labor ratio turns
out to be larger than the second one, and the capital-labor ratio goes up with all three pop-
41Under the ﬁnancing assumption, where the payroll tax rate is kept at the current-law level and only future
beneﬁts are reduced, there are no effects of increasing the lifetime tax payments and beneﬁt receipts.
28ulation projections—up by 32.6 percent under alternative II, 12.9 percent under alternative
I, and 60.1 percent under alternative III in the long run. The second effect is largest when
the government is assumed to raise the payroll tax, keeping the beneﬁts at the current-law
level. Even under this ﬁnancing assumption, however, the capital-labor ratio increases by
24.2 percent in the long run under alternative II.42
In the model economy, the household saving rate is above the steady-state level in 2004
and, accordingly, national wealth grows faster than both GDP and labor supply. But, house-
hold savings decrease most of the years in 2004-2200. The saving rate, measured by the
ratio of savings to GDP, declines by 2.69 [1.44] percentage points for the ﬁrst 75 years and
by 3.03 [1.88] percentage points in the long run in a closed [small open] economy with the
intermediate population projection, returning to the steady-state saving rate.43
Before the Social Security trust funds are depleted, the OASDI payroll tax revenue is
simply determined by household earnings—labor supply multiplied by the wage rate—and
it declines slightly as labor supply decreases. The OASDI beneﬁt expenditure increases
rapidly, but its pace depends on the population projection. Although the replacement rates
of beneﬁts are cut when the trust funds are depleted, the beneﬁt expenditure increases faster
than GDP in the long run.
With the intermediate population projection, the OASDI payroll tax rate is 19.3 [22.2]
percent higher and the beneﬁt replacement rates are 13.9 [15.4] percent lower in 2078 (after
75 years) than the current-law levels in a closed [small open] economy44 (These numbers are
not in Table 10.) Also, in a closed economy, the interest rate falls by 1.90 percentage points
and the wage rate rises by 7.9 percent during the ﬁrst 75 years, due to the increase in national
42Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003) calculate equilibrium transition paths with an aging population. In their
“Base Case” of the U.S. economy, the capital-labor ratio falls by 53 percent from 2000 to 2100 as the population
ages Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) obtain similar results. These authors assumed that the OASDI
beneﬁts are kept at the current-law level and the payroll tax rate is increased to balance the Social Security
account, and that all of the government expenditure, which is population indexed, is ﬁnanced with a wage tax
rather than an income tax or a consumption tax.
43Unfortunately, the present model does not predict the decline in the private saving rates in 1990s. The further
reﬁnement of the model is needed. Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) show that the government transfers
from young and future households to current old households, such as the increase in Medicare beneﬁts, explain
a large part of this decline.
44When the trust funds are depleted, a half of the OASDI deﬁcit is covered by the increase in payroll tax rates
and the rest of the deﬁcit is covered by the reduction of beneﬁts. The numbers in percent changes are different
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Figure 3: The Baseline Economy with the Population Projection Alternative II (Changes
from the population-adjusted balanced growth path through year 2004; Payroll tax is in-
creased and beneﬁts are cut when the trust funds are depleted)
30wealth and the decrease in labor supply.
Because the intermediate population projection is used as the baseline economy for the
policy experiments in Section 5, Figure 3 also shows the equilibrium transition path of se-
lected variables with the projection alternative II. The ﬁgures before 2004 (the vertical line)
do not necessarily show the forecast of the model, but those indicate the adjustment process
from the 1961 steady-state economy to the 2003 aging economy.
5 Policy Experiments
In Section 4, the ﬁnancing assumption for the OASDI budget is that the payroll tax rate
and beneﬁt replacement rates are kept at the current-law levels as long as the trust funds
last and that, when the trust funds are depleted, the payroll tax rate is increased and beneﬁt
replacement rates are reduced to keep the trust funds at zero thereafter. One the trust funds
are depleted, the OASDI becomes the pay-as-you-go system.
In this section, alternative ﬁnancing assumptions for the OASDI budget are examined.
The ﬁrst alternative assumption is that, when the trust funds are depleted, beneﬁt replace-
ment rates are kept at the current-law levels and the payroll tax rate is increased to make the
OASDI budget balanced (and to keep the trust funds at zero) thereafter.45
The second alternative is that, when the trust funds are depleted, the payroll tax rate is
kept at the current-law levels and beneﬁt replacement rates are reduced to make the OASDI
budget balanced thereafter.
The last policy experiment assumes that the payroll tax rate is increased immediately
in 2004 by 10 percent and that, when the trust funds are depleted, the payroll tax rate is
increased and beneﬁt replacement rates are reduced to make the OASDI budget balanced
thereafter.
Due to limits of space, all of those policy experiments use the intermediate population
projection (alternative II), and the results are shown as changes from the baseline economy,
which assumes both the payroll tax rate and beneﬁts are changed when the trust funds are
45As explained brieﬂy in Section 4, Kotlikoff, Smetters, Walliser (2001) and Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff
(2003) use this type of ﬁnancing assumptions. But, those authors assume the pay-as-you-go Social Security
system without any trust funds, and the payroll tax rates are increased immediately.
31depleted, with the same population projection.
5.1 Alternative Government Financing Assumptions
The ﬁnancing assumption for the OASDI budget affects the size of the Social Security
system—the lifetime payroll tax payments and the lifetime beneﬁt receipts per household.
Accordingly, the assumption affects the life-cycle savings and working hours of households
even before the payroll tax rate and beneﬁt replacement rates are changed.
The ﬁrst alternative ﬁnancing assumption and the second one are symmetric. The pol-
icy experiments under those two assumptions show the possible range of macroeconomic
variables and social welfare in the economy with the population projection alternative II.
5.1.1 The Payroll Tax Rate Is Increased When the Trust Funds Are Depleted
Table 13 shows the result of this policy experiment. The trust funds are depleted in 2053
[2056] in a closed [small open] economy. In the long run, the payroll tax rate has to be
increased by 45.3 [48.9] percent in a closed [small open] economy. (The numbers are not
s h o w ni nT a b l e1 3 . )
Compared to the baseline economy, in the long run, the payroll tax revenue and beneﬁt
expenditure increase by 1.16 [1.20] percent as a percentage of GDP in a closed [small open]
economy. The increase in the lifetime payroll tax and beneﬁts reduces private wealth and
labor supply, because households expect larger beneﬁts compared to the baseline economy,
and they have to accumulate less life-cycle savings for the period after retirement. The higher
pay roll tax rate reduces the disposable income and savings of households. In the long run,
national wealth decreases by 7.2 [8.2] percent in a closed [small open] economy. The saving
rate is lower throughout the transition path. Private consumption increases in the short run
because of the lower saving rate, but it decreases in the log run due to the lower disposable
income.
The effect on labor supply is ambiguous in a small open economy. Before the payroll
tax is increased, labor supply is increased by the intertemporal substitution effect and de-
creased by the income effect from the increase in the lifetime beneﬁts. Once the payroll tax
is increased, labor supply is possibly decreased by the substitution effect, but this effect does
32Table 13: The Payroll Tax Rate Is Increased and Beneﬁts Are Kept at the Current-Law Level
When the Trust Funds Are Depleated (Changes from the Baseline Economy with Alternative
II)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) -0.8 -4.1 -6.3 -7.2 -0.3 -2.3 -5.4 -2.7
%ch(Labor Supply) -0.3 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5
%ch(GNP) -0.4 -1.8 -2.5 -2.8 -0.2 -1.0 -2.2 -1.1
%ch(Consumption) 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.0
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.28 -1.05 -0.46 -0.30 -0.12 -0.52 -0.53 -0.39
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.00 0.96 1.04 1.16 0.00 0.05 0.91 0.32
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 0.02 0.47 1.04 1.16 0.01 0.07 0.91 0.33
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
ch(Interest Rate%) 0.04 0.21 0.36 0.42 0.01 0.13 0.30 0.15
%ch(Wage Rate) -0.2 -1.6 -2.3 -2.7 0.0 -0.6 -2.0 -0.9
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) -0.6 -3.8 -6.7 -8.2 -0.2 -2.0 -5.5 -2.6
%ch(Labor Supply) -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
%ch(GNP) -0.3 -1.4 -2.7 -3.2 -0.1 -0.8 -2.2 -1.0
%ch(Consumption) 0.2 0.4 -0.7 -1.4 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.0
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.28 -0.98 -0.85 -0.65 -0.11 -0.65 -0.91 -0.56
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.00 0.00 1.09 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.29
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 0.01 0.00 1.09 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.29
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Percent changes or changes in percentage points from the baseline economy with both payroll tax increases
and beneﬁt cuts. The trust funds are depleted in 2053 in a closed economy and 2056 in a small open economy.
not seem to be large because of the higher beneﬁt replacement rates. In a closed economy,
however, labor supply decreases slightly throughout the transition path because of the lower
wage rate. In a closed economy, the interest rate is 0.42 percentage points higher in the long
run than the baseline, and the wage rate is 2.7 percent lower than the baseline.
The welfare gains and losses from the policy experiment are measure by compensating
variations in wealth. That is, the welfare gain [loss] of a household is calculated as once-
in-a-lifetime wealth tax [transfer] (which is made when the policy change is announced for
current households or when the future household becomes age 20) that makes the household
as better off as the baseline economy.
The welfare gains and losses differ according to the state of each household. Figure 4
(a) shows the average gains and losses by age cohort, and Figure 4 (b), (c), and (d) show the
average gains and losses by age cohort for a speciﬁc temporary (not lifetime) working ability
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Figure 4: Welfare Gains and Losses from the Baseline Economy—The Payroll Tax Rate Is
Increased When the Trust Funds Are Depleted (Compensating Variation in Wealth as Per-
centages of Per-Household GDP)
class—the bottom 20 percent, the mid 20 percent, and the top 1 percent, respectively.
According to Figure 4 (a), households that enter to the economy before 2030 [2032] in
a closed [small open] economy are on average better off by the policy change, and future
households that enter to the economy after 2030 [2032] are worse off. If the new households
belong to the top 1 percent temporary working ability class, households that enter to the
economy before 2042 [2037] in a closed [small open] economy are still better off.
5.1.2 Beneﬁt Replacement Rates Are Reduced When the Trust Funds Are Depleted
Table 14 shows the result of this policy change. The trust funds are depleted in almost the
same years as before—2053 [2057] in a closed [small open] economy. In the long run,
beneﬁt replacement rates have to be reduced by 30.2 [33.3] percent in a closed [small open]
economy. (These numbers are not shown in Table 14.)
Compared to the baseline economy, in the long run, the payroll tax revenue and beneﬁt
34Table 14: Beneﬁt Replacement Rates Are Reduced and the Payroll Tax Rate Is Kept at
the Current-Law Level When the Trust Funds Are Depleated (Changes from the Baseline
Economy with Alternative II)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 0.9 4.6 7.2 8.3 0.3 2.6 6.2 3.0
%ch(Labor Supply) 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.5
%ch(GNP) 0.5 1.9 2.7 3.1 0.2 1.1 2.4 1.2
%ch(Consumption) -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.1
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) 0.31 1.20 0.51 0.34 0.13 0.59 0.59 0.44
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.00 -0.39 -0.96 -1.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.83 -0.29
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) -0.02 0.13 -0.96 -1.10 -0.01 -0.05 -0.83 -0.30
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
ch(Interest Rate%) -0.04 -0.25 -0.38 -0.43 -0.01 -0.14 -0.32 -0.16
%ch(Wage Rate) 0.2 1.4 2.5 2.9 0.1 0.7 2.1 0.9
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 0.8 4.3 7.7 9.4 0.3 2.3 6.3 3.0
%ch(Labor Supply) 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
%ch(GNP) 0.3 1.6 3.0 3.6 0.1 0.9 2.5 1.2
%ch(Consumption) -0.3 -0.4 0.7 1.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 -0.1
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) 0.33 1.11 0.99 0.75 0.13 0.74 1.05 0.64
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.00 0.00 -1.10 -1.22 0.00 0.00 -0.87 -0.29
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) -0.01 0.01 -1.10 -1.22 0.00 0.00 -0.87 -0.29
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Percent changes or changes in percentage points from the baseline economy with both payroll tax increases
and beneﬁt cuts. The trust funds are depleted in 2053 in a closed economy and 2057 in a small open economy.
expenditure decrease by 1.10 [1.22] percent as a percentage of GDP in a closed [small open]
economy. Expecting smaller beneﬁts, households accumulate larger life-cycle savings for
their retirements.
In the long run, national wealth increases by 8.3 [9.4] percent in a closed [small open]
economy. The saving rate is higher throughout the transition path, and private consumption
decreases in the short run but increases in the log run. The effect on labor supply is ambigu-
ous in a small open economy, but labor supply will increase in a closed economy because of
the higher wage rate. In a closed economy, the interest rate falls by 0.43 percentage points in
t h el o n gr u n ,a n dt h ew a g er a t er i s e sb y2 . 9p e r c e n t .
Figure 5 (a) shows the average gains and losses by age cohort, and Figure 5 (b), (c), and
(d) show the average gains and losses by age cohort and by temporary working ability class.
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Figure 5: Welfare Gains and Losses from the Baseline Economy—Beneﬁt Replacement
R a t e sA r eR e d u c e dW h e nt h eT r u s tF u n d sA r eD e p l e t e d( C o m p e n s a t i n gV a r i a t i o ni nW e a l t h
as Percentages of Per-Household GDP)
According to Figure 5, households that enter to the economy before 2035 [2034] in a closed
[small open] economy are on average worse off by the policy change, and households that
enter to the economy after 2035 [2034] are on average worse off.
Although both of those two alternative economies are not Pareto superior to the baseline
economy, the second one with reducing future beneﬁts seems to be more efﬁcient than the
ﬁrst one with increasing payroll tax rates, according to Figures 4 and 5. Further evaluations
of welfare gains are left for future research.46
46Nishiyama and Smetters (2003) introduce a mechanism called the lump-sum redistribution authority, which
was originally developed in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), to their heterogeneous-agent lifecycle model, and
they analyze the efﬁciency gain or loss of a policy change in an equilibrium transition path.
36Table 15: The Payroll Tax Rate Is Increased Immediately by 10 Percent (Changes from the
Baseline Economy with Alternative II)
Year Average
2028 2053 2078 2200 04-28 29-53 54-78 04-78
Closed Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 1.6 1.0 -1.4 -1.8 0.9 1.5 -0.5 0.6
%ch(Labor Supply) 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
%ch(GNP) 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.7 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.2
%ch(Consumption) -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.2
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.43 -0.33 -0.14 -0.07 -0.30 -0.66 0.28 -0.23
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.25 0.48 0.46 -0.10 0.28
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) -0.03 0.36 0.26 0.25 -0.01 -0.01 0.60 0.19
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 10.1 19.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 14.8 6.7 8.9
ch(Interest Rate%) -0.11 -0.06 0.08 0.10 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 -0.05
%ch(Wage Rate) 0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Small Open Economy
%ch(National Wealth) 2.2 3.1 0.0 -1.8 1.2 2.9 1.7 1.9
%ch(Labor Supply) -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0
%ch(GNP) 0.7 1.1 0.1 -0.7 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.7
%ch(Consumption) -0.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 0.3 -0.2
ch(Private Savings / GDP%) -0.37 -1.21 0.94 -0.14 -0.23 -0.74 0.19 -0.26
ch(OASDI Payroll Tax / GDP%) 0.48 0.48 -0.62 0.24 0.49 0.48 -0.39 0.19
ch(OASDI Beneﬁts / GDP%) 0.00 -0.01 1.09 0.24 0.00 -0.00 0.85 0.28
ch(Trust Funds / GDP%) 12.5 29.0 6.5 0.0 6.0 20.7 21.7 16.1
Percent changes or changes in percentage points from the baseline economy with both payroll tax increases
and beneﬁt cuts. The trust funds are depleted in 2070 in a closed economy and 2081 in a small open economy.
5.2 The Payroll Tax Rate Is Increased Immediately by 10 Percent
With a reasonable population projection, such as the intermediate population projection al-
ternative II, the current-law Social Security system is not sustainable. The trust funds are
eventually depleted, and the government has to increase payroll tax, reduce beneﬁts, or in-
crease transfers from the rest of the government budget. One of the simplest reform plans is
increasing the payroll tax rate immediately rather than waiting for the depletion of the trust
funds.
In this policy experiment, the payroll tax rate is increased immediately (in 2004) by 10
percent and, when the trust funds are depleted, the payroll tax rate is increased further and
beneﬁt replacement rates are reduced so that each of those changes covers a half of the deﬁcit
thereafter.
Table 15 shows the result of this policy change. The trust funds last until 2070 [2081]
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Figure 6: Welfare Gains and Losses from the Baseline Economy—The Payroll Tax Rate Is
Increased Immediately by 10 Percent (Compensating Variation in Wealth as Percentages of
Per-Household GDP)
in a closed [small open] economy. Compared to the baseline economy, in the long run,
the payroll tax rate is higher by 4.4 percent and beneﬁt replacement rates are higher by
3.9 percent, compared to the baseline economy. Also the payroll tax revenue and beneﬁt
expenditure are larger than the baseline economy by 0.25 [0.24] percent as a percentage of
GDP in a closed [small open] economy.
Becauseofthelowerafter-taxincome, privatesavings asapercentageofGDParesmaller
throughout the transition path, and private wealth decreases from the baseline economy. In
the short run, however, national wealth increases because of the increase in the trust funds.
As explained before, the effect on labor supply in a small open economy is ambiguous. In a
closed economy, labor supply increases slightly in the short run because of the higher wage
rate, but it decreases in the long run. The interest rate rises 0.10 percentage points from the
baseline in the long run, and the wage rate falls by 0.7 percent.
38Intuitively, an immediate increase in the payroll tax rate to postpone the depletion of the
trust funds would likely hurt current working-age households and beneﬁt future households.
Then, one of the interesting questions is whether those future households would be better off
more than current working-age households would be worse off.
Figure 6 (a) shows the average welfare gains and losses from the baseline economy by
age cohort, and Figure 6 (b), (c), and (d) show the average gains and losses by age cohort for
selected temporary working ability classes.
According to Figure 6, households are on average worse off in almost all age cohorts,
although welfare losses by this policy change are modest. Those households whose earnings
ability is at their peak in 2004-2053 [2056] in a closed [small open] economy tend to be hurt
more than others. Those households whose ability is peak in 2053-2070 [2056-2081] tend to
be hurt less. But, except for a few households in the top 1 percent working ability class, all
households are worse off from the policy change, because of the reduction in private wealth
(and accidental bequest receipts) and the long-run decline in the wage rate.47
6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper extends a heterogeneous-agent overlapping generations model with idio-
syncratic working ability shocks and mortality shocks by introducing an aging population of
the United States. The paper constructs baseline economies as equilibrium transition paths
with three population projections in Social Security Administration (2003). Then, the al-
ternative economies with other government ﬁnancing assumptions are examined as policy
experiments.
There are two main ﬁndings in the present paper. First, under a reasonable parameter
setting and population projection, private wealth per household is likely to increase and labor
supply per capita is likely to decrease as the population ages. However, this result depends
possibly on the initial size of the Social Security system and the ﬁnancing assumption for
both the Social Security budget and the rest of the government budget.
47According to Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1990), the optimal policy response to an anticipated
demographic change is almost certainly a reduction in the national saving rate. Elmenmdorf and Sheiner (2000)
also argue that the optimal response to the aging of the U.S. population is to allow future cohorts to bear much
or all that burden. The last policy experiment in the present paper is conﬁrmative with those conclusions.
39Second, according to the present model, an earlier Social Security reform may not neces-
sarily improve the efﬁciency of the economy and the welfare of future households. The last
policy experiment demonstrates that an immediate increase in the payroll tax rate would pos-
sibly be worse than waiting for the increase in the tax rate until the trust funds are depleted.
Overall, those numerical exercises show how the economy with an aging population
looks like and how the aging population projection and the government ﬁnancing assumption
affect macro-economic and welfare implications.
Although policy experiments performed in the present paper are very simple, more com-
plex experiments on Social Security reform can easily be done, since the present model has
already been equipped with a detailed Social Security system. More realistic reform plans,
including those with individual (personal savings) accounts, will be examined in the separate
paper, using one of baseline economies constructed in the present paper.
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